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ncome-based eligibility recertification
is an essential component in virtually
all means-tested social programs in the
United States. It exists to ensure that
the benefit is targeted at the neediest
individuals or families. In many studies
that examine the effect of means-tested
programs on labor supply, an implicit
assumption is that program eligibility
is constantly monitored. However,
many of these programs do not operate
this way, and the time between two
consecutive eligibility certifications, or
the “recertification period,” can be as
long as a year. Although this policy lever
is recognized and its effect on program
participation is explored in several studies
of transfer programs (e.g., Currie and
Grogger 2001; Kabbani and Wilde 2003;
Prell 2008; and Ribar, Edelhoch, and Liu
2008), a formal theoretical and empirical
investigation has not been carried out to
address how program participants may
respond to the incentives resulting from
the lack of constant income monitoring.
In my research, I attempt to fill this
gap by examining families’ behavioral
responses to the continuous eligibility
provision for children participating in
Medicaid and the State Children’s Health
Insurance Program (SCHIP, or simply
CHIP). The analysis of income and labor
supply responses is key in answering
the important policy question of how
often eligibility monitoring should be
conducted.
Uninterrupted eligibility monitoring
ensures that an income-tested program is
effectively targeting the needy. However,
if monitoring is costly and incomes
of program participants change little
over time, it may be sensible for the
government to decrease the frequency
of eligibility checks and offer a period
of “continuous eligibility.” Granting

continuous eligibility increases the value
of a transfer program to its participants in
two ways. First, less frequent monitoring
reduces transaction costs associated with
gathering eligibility materials and visiting
caseworkers for program beneficiaries.
Second, continuous eligibility provisions
allow families to be less constrained in
their labor supply decisions. That is, once
households qualify for an income-tested
program for a specified period, they will
not be disqualified even if their incomes
exceed the maximum income threshold,
allowing them to work the desired
amount while retaining their benefits.
However, the provisions increase the
possibility for less needy households
to lower their incomes temporarily in

Continuous eligibility
provisions allow families to
be less constrained in their
labor supply decisions.
order to qualify for the program, and
then revert to their usual incomes while
enjoying the benefits.
Because the families that behave
strategically are not the intended
beneficiaries of the program, setting the
continuous eligibility period involves
the trade-off between minimizing the
number of such families and reducing
the economic loss associated with
monitoring. As mentioned above, the loss
includes the administrative costs to the
government, pecuniary and time costs
of families participating in the program,
and the deprivation of program benefits
for some of the families most in need
when the transaction costs of eligibility
recertifications become insurmountable.
Olson, Tang, and Newacheck (2005)
show that children who experience
interruptions in health insurance coverage

are more likely to have unmet health care
needs; therefore, imposing bureaucratic
burden on otherwise eligible families
may reduce targeting efficiency as well.
Given these trade-offs, understanding
the behavioral response to the lack of
eligibility monitoring has important
policy implications. The recertification
period may be too long if we find
evidence of families strategically and
temporarily lowering their incomes in
order to gain program eligibility. If no
strategic behavior is found, however, it
may be beneficial to lengthen the period
of eligibility.
Income and Labor Supply Responses
I carry out an empirical investigation
of the labor supply effect of the
continuous eligibility provisions in the
context of Medicaid/CHIP and provide
a framework to compute the optimal
eligibility recertification frequency.
Along with creating the SCHIP program,
the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 gives
states the option to continuously insure
children for up to 12 months in their
public insurance programs regardless of
changes in family income during that
period. A third of the states implemented
the continuous eligibility option in their
public insurance program for children.
These states present an opportunity
to gauge the significance of the
aforementioned strategic behavior, which
then sheds light on the choice of the
optimal continuous eligibility period.
Using the 2001 and 2004 panels
of the Survey of Income and Program
Participation, I follow an event-study
framework and trace out families’
incomes as their children enrolled in
Medicaid/CHIP. Figure 1 plots the
movement of average family incomes
over the 48 months around the beginning
of a public insurance spell.
Neither of the panels shows a
pronounced dip-and-rebound in income
in the six months before and after the
spell start. For the 2001 panel, the income
trend leading up to the beginning of the
public insurance spell is practically flat;
the average income increases gradually
during the spell especially after 12
months, but the period immediately
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Figure 1 Average Family Income by Month in Public Insurance Spell
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following the spell start shows no
rebound. In the 2004 panel, the income
process shows a persistent downward
trend throughout the four-year window
without a visible rebound.
Even though the strategic behavior
predicted by the labor supply model is
not salient in Figure 1, certain subgroups
may be expected to exhibit stronger
responses than others. Examining these
subgroups separately may help to isolate
the effects that are otherwise masked in
the full sample. Among others, I select
several subsamples in which families
may adjust their labor supply more easily
(two-parent families), be more likely to
understand program rules (at least one
parent is college educated), or face a
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the model prediction is rejected with
confidence.
Comparisons of income processes
between counterfactual groups are
also carried out to address the issues
of unaccounted income trends over a
Medicaid/CHIP spell, concentration of
strategic behavior in only a subset of
the families, as well as possible model
misspecification in the calibration
exercise. I compare the income processes
between high- and low-income families
and families in states that did and did
not provide 12 months of continuous
eligibility to simultaneously address
all three of those issues. High-income
families and those living in states
providing 12-month continuous eligibility
are expected to exhibit stronger strategic
behavior than their counterparts, but the
counterfactual analysis does not reveal
the rebound magnitude to be statistically
significant between the different groups.
Again, the result provides no evidence
indicative of the strategic behavior as
predicted by a standard economic model.
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stronger incentive to behave strategically
(families with more children). The
subsample analyses reveal income trends
similar to those in the full sample and are
not indicative of strategic behavior.
Testing Model Predictions
Because of the relatively small
sample size, I cannot strictly rule out
a small income rebound in several of
my samples. Therefore, I calibrate the
expected income rebound magnitude
based on a standard economic model
and compare it to the actual rebound
magnitude. In all subsamples, the actual
rebound magnitude is smaller than
the model-predicted magnitude, and

With strategic behavior practically
ruled out, I explore the following policy
question: What is the right recertification
frequency for families participating in
Medicaid/CHIP? The two key factors
in answering the question are 1) the
volatility of the income process, and
2) the costs associated with recertification.
Intuitively, if income does not change
at all over time, then the government
only needs to check income once to
identify the needy population. But if
there is a lot of movement across the
public insurance eligibility cutoff, more
frequent recertifications may be called
for, which will remove families from the
program when they no longer need the
benefits. The need to monitor income
must then be weighed against the cost of
eligibility recertification, which should
be conducted less frequently if the
cost of the verification process is high
for the government or for the program
participants.
Using a simple economic
framework, I compute the optimal

monitoring frequency under various
assumptions regarding social welfare
and recertification costs. The calculation
suggests that 12 months may serve as a
lower bound on the length of the optimal
continuous eligibility period. That
said, with technological advancement
and improved data sharing among
government agencies, recertification costs
may decrease significantly in the future,
in which case the continuous eligibility
period can be shortened to improve
targeting efficiency.

The WEfocus Book Series
The Upjohn Press has begun a new series of “short books” called the “WEfocus
series.” Books in this series will be authored by noted experts in the subjects and
will provide a concise discussion of a range of important labor market issues along
with the programs and policy recommendations that address those issues. The most
recent book in the series is From Preschool to Prosperity: The Economic Payoff to
Early Childhood Education, by Timothy J. Bartik. Other entries currently scheduled
to appear in the series will address workers’ compensation, the railroad retirement
system, apprenticeships, employer resource networks, and natural disasters and the
labor market. Books in this series will be available as paperbacks and as free PDF
downloads from http://www.upjohn.org.

References
Currie, Janet, and Jefferey Grogger.
2001. “Explaining Recent Declines in
Food Stamp Program Participation.”
Brookings-Wharton Papers on Urban
Affairs. Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution, pp. 203–244.
Kabbani, Nader S., and Parke E.Wilde.
2003. “Short Recertification Periods in
the U.S. Food Stamp Program.” Journal
of Human Resources 38(4): 1112–1138.
Olson, Lynn M., Suk-fong S. Tang,
and Paul W. Newacheck. 2005. “Children
in the United States with Discontinuous
Health Insurance Coverage.” New
England Journal of Medicine 353(4):
382–391.
Prell, Mark A. 2008. “Income
Volatility and Certification Duration for
WIC Children.” In Income Volatility and
Food Assistance in the United States,
Dean Jolliffe and James Patrick Ziliak,
eds. Kalamazoo, MI: W. E. Upjohn
Institute for Employment Research, pp.
259–294.
Ribar, David C., Marilyn Edelhoch,
and Qiduan Liu. 2008. “Watching
the Clocks: The Role of Food Stamp
Recertification and TANF Time Limits in
Caseload Dynamics.” Journal of Human
Resources 43(1): 208–239.
Zhuan Pei is an assistant professor of
economics at Brandeis University.

Investing in Childhood Education
DF

P
Free

From Preschool to Prosperity

The Economic Payoff to Early Childhood Education
Timothy J. Bartik

WE
focus
series

“The economic benefits of investing in high-quality early childhood education are clear and backed by an impressive amount
of research, as laid out in Tim Bartik’s book. With businesses
concerned about securing a future skilled workforce, with our
military leaders concerned about the future supply of qualified
recruits, and with our society concerned about the troubling
increase in income inequality, we should be looking at proven
investments in children and youth that strengthen our human
capital and the future of our economy.” —Arthur J. Rolnick
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PDF free at http://www.upjohn.org/sites/default/files/WEfocus/FromPreschoolto
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Early Childhood Programs and Local Economic Development
Timothy J. Bartik
“Tim Bartik has written a thoughtful book on the value of a
local approach to financing and creating early interventions to
foster child development. The economic case for supplementing
the early environments of disadvantaged children is compelling.
Annual rates of return of 7–10 percent per annum have been
estimated—higher than return on stocks over the period 1945–
2008 . . . In an era of stringent federal budgets, Bartik offers a
plan for raising the support needed to put effective programs
in place.” —James Heckman, Nobel Prize–winning economist,
University of Chicago
417 pp. 2011 $45 cloth 978-0-88099-373-9 $20 paper 978-0-88099-372-2
Read the first chapter at: research.upjohn.org/up_press/207/.

